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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
REHEARING GRANTED: ALLIED BANK 
INTERNATIONAL V. BANCO AGRICOLA CREDITO 
DE CARTAGO AND THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
DEBT CRISIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States District Court for the Southern District has 
ordered a rehearing of the ruling in Allied Bank International v. 
Banco Agricola Credito de Cartago1 (Allied). This is well received 
news in the banking community because the magnitude of foreign 
1. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Allied brought the action as an agent for a syn-
dicate of thirty-nine banks (United States and foreign) to recover on promissory notes issued 
in connection with loan agreements. The debt was, by the terms of the instrument, payable 
in New York City. The instrument was in default. The case was dismissed by the district 
court due to a Costa Rican governmental decree setting out a moratorium on the payment 
of foreign debts. The court held that repayment was precluded under the act of state doc-
trine. Rescheduling of Costa Rica's obligations took place while the action was pending in 
the district court. Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey, a member of the syndicate, 
declined to enter into a new agreement with the other participants. As the only member 
not entering into a new agreement, the appeal went forward on behalf of Fidelity Union 
Trust Company. A decision was handed down on April 23, 1984, where a panel of the court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal without addressing the act of state doctrine but rather 
by stating that the actions of the Costa Rican Government that precipitated the default 
are consistent with United States laws and urging that comity requires the Costa Rican 
action to be effective in the United States courts. A rehearing was granted on July 3, 1984, 
and the court was scheduled to begin the case in September 1984. Contra Libra Bank Ltd. 
v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The facts of Libra Bank 
are very similar to those of Allied Bank. See infra note 3. The court in Libra Bank recog-
nized that there was merely an attempt by a foreign sovereign to avoid payment of a debt 
that it concededly owed to its creditors. The court found that although a debtor may be 
sued at the creditor's choice in either of the two jurisdictions, the legal incidents of the 
debt may place it in the United States for the purposes of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 
881. The court concluded that "a United States court may still find that the situs of the 
debt was in the [United States] at the time of the attempted confiscation." Id. 
The reason for the banning of the act of state doctrine is more easily recognized when 
the reasonable expectations that underlie the territorial limitation are brought to light. In 
conclusion, the key elements were: (1) Banco Nacional contracted to repay the loan in New 
York City; (2) it consented to jurisdiction of U.S. courts; (3) it waived its sovereign immunity 
with respect to legal proceedings concerning the debt; and (4) it continued to maintain assets 
in the U.S. Id. at 884. 
The court considered that because the act of state was incomplete at the time of 
the attempted confiscation, and that the bank had assets in the U.S., the act of state was 
incomplete with the acquiescence of the U.S. Id. (citing Maltina Corp., 462 F.2d at 1028.) 
Considering these points it could hardly be said that the foreign sovereign had a reasonable 
expectation of dominion over the legal rights involved in the dispute. Id. 
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debt, especially to Latin and South American countries, is at an 
all time zenith. The early 1970's evidenced an unprecedented 
American growth in banking when United States banks expanded 
their international operations.2 The potential for future loan activity 
may be affected to a considerable extent, depending on how Allied 
is decided upon rehearing.3 
The current international debt crisis is among the most critical 
problems on the world economic agenda. The figures are 
astronomical: the total debt load for the lesser developed countries 
(LDC's) exceeds $750 billion.4 Of this amount over one-half is owed 
2. The increase in lending activity by major U.S. banks occurred when markets 
perceived to offer excellent opportunities improved due to the changing world economic 
situation. While numerous factors contributed to the growth of international lending by U.S. 
banks, Arthur F. Burns of the Federal Reserve Board cited three major reasons: "first, the 
enormous use of financing needs around the world that was occasioned by the quituplicy 
of oil prices; second, the willingness of American banks to respond to those financing needs; 
third, the growth of multinational corporations and the internationalization of banking through 
the Eurocurrency markets." International Banking Operations: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Housing Com-
mittee on Banking. Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1977). Bank activity 
increased in, among other areas, the Latin American countries and their governmental in-
strumentalities. Generally, the foreign government will desire a level of financing well beyond 
the capabilities of a single institution. To service this need, a lending syndicate is organiz-
ed by a major bank that will take the position as the syndicate manager. For a thorough 
discussion on lending syndicates, see generally, Clarke & Farrar, Ri,ghts and Duties of Managing 
and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans to Government Borrowers, 1 U. OF ILL. L.R. 229 (1982). 
3. In Allied, the inquiry reached the point of whether the Costa Rican directives in-
structing Banco Credito de Cartago not to pay its loan obligation fell within the purview 
of the act of state doctrine. 566 F. Supp. at 1443. The court followed the circuit court case 
of Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n. 38 
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). At that point Allied departed from Libra 
Bank, 570 F. Supp. 870, where it stated that the crucial factor in the instant case was the 
conduct of the Costa Rican Government that prevented the payment of the loans through 
its decrees. The court did not want to put the judicial branch of the United States at odds 
with the Costa Rican Government, and through such action risk embarrassment to the rela-
tions between the executive branch of the United States and the Costa Rican Government. 
The court concluded by stating that the act of state doctrine bars the summary judgment 
motion of Allied and clearly such a "defense dictates denial of Allied's motion." 566 F. Supp. 
at 1444. Therefore, the state of the law on the question of the act of state doctrine, sovereign 
immunity, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is an open question where on iden-
tical facts, the Libra Bank and Allied Bank courts arrived at opposite conclusions. The up-
coming rehearing will either solidify the court's position or leave the question open for the 
future. 
4. The International Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1983, 
at 11. In 1982, Western banks had in excess of $180 billion loaned to Latin America. It has 
become evident that large banks became locked into their foreign loans. The withdrawal 
of an individual bank from any given country would very likely bring the country's downfall 
as well as the bank's insolvency. Id. The exposure of ten leading American banks should 
help to illustrate the magnitude of the problem: 
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to commercial banks. 5 The strain on the economic system is 
evidenced by the fact that twenty-five countries with bank loans 
of approximately $250 billion have been forced to reschedule their 
debts.6 This huge debt load is a result of structural imbalances7 in 
the various countries' external payments as a result of the first oil 
crisis in the early 1970's.8 The oil price hike presented the oil im-
porting LDC's with the choice of imposing abrupt deflation on their 
economies or to run increased current-account deficits. These 
deficits would eventually be covered by huge borrowings from the 
international banking community. 
The commercial banks seized the opportunity to derive a profit 
by reloaning the savings of the Organization of Petroleum Expor-
ting Countries (OPEC) to the LDC's where the demand for capital 
was large. While recycling OPEC surpluses to the LDC's was con-
sidered a workable plan, Western governments did not envision an 




(1) (2) (3) Tot. of of Bk's 
Brazil Mexico Venezuela Col. 1-2-3 equity 
Citicorp 4.4 3.3 1.1 8.7 180 
Bank of America 2.3 2.5 2.0 6.8 148 
Chase 2.4 1.7 1.0 5.1 183 
Man. Hanover 2.0 1.7 1.1 4.8 174 
Morgan Guaranty 1.7 1.1 0.5 3.3 122 
Chemical 1.3 1.5 2.8 143 
Bankers Trust 0.9 0.9 0.5 2.2 143 
Cont. Illinois 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.6 96 
First Interstate 0.5 0.7 1.2 64 
Security Pacific 0.5 0.5 1.0 68 
Id. at 13 (citing AM. BANKER). 
5. Id. Rescheduling of loans has become a normal practice in international loans. The 
typical scenario includes International Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement. The IMF, generally, 
puts economic conditions on its loans. Such conditions typically call for severe domestic 
austerity that tend to squeeze economic growth and precipitate bankruptcies in the private 
sector. A typical IMF strategy would include freeing up interest rates, cutting budget deficits, 
and frequent minor currency devaluations to maintain competitiveness in agriculture and 
industry. While growth falls off, the squeeze is intended to produce a trade surplus that 
can be applied to debt servicing. See generally The Crash of 198?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 
1982, ~t 23. 
6. See The International Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, supra note 4. 
7. Id. at 11. 
8. Id. 
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funds.9 The foundation for the massive lending was based on the 
capital and resources of the principle Western banks and not upon 
the developed world's resources.10 
II. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The United States recognized the potentially grave impact that 
the Allied decision could stir among the international banking com-
munity. In its brief as amicus curiae in support of the petition for 
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane, the United States 
noted that the "decision (in Allied) is based on a misunderstanding 
of the policy of the United States on a matter of major conse-
quence .... "11 The United States submitted that in "holding that 
9. The International Debt Threat: A Concerted Way Out, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1983, at 14. 
10. Id. The New York banks committed themselves to the largest share of the loans, 
acting as the main money-center institutions of the world banking system. The money-center 
banks acted directly to the borrowers as well as indirectly to the interbank system. The 
money-center banks made a surplus pool of funds available to smaller banks or to foreign 
banks that were unable to directly attract deposits denominated in foreign currency. 
Naturally, these smaller institutions in turn began to lend these funds to the LDC's where 
the money-center banks recognized the potential for handsome returns. In effect, the 
American money-center banks were further exposed due to the smaller banks' lending ac-
tivities to the LDC's. This chain of events precipitated the world banking community's cur-
rent problem. It is interesting to note that there is no limitation over the end use of funds 
after they are channelled through to the intermediate banks. Apparently, these banks should 
make an independent analysis of the risk of the situation. But, the evidence points to a desire 
to reap large profits by joining the massive lending spree to the LDC's. See generally The 
International Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, supra note 4, at 11. The American banks 
were not the only institutions involved. This large financial commitment applies to the leading 
British, German, and Japanese banks. These money-center institutions are large banks that 
act as primary depositories of surplus funds. The American authorities did not discourage 
these developments and, actually, the Treasury viewed it as proper intermediation of the 
market place in the supply and demand of money. The Federal Reserve applauded the 
dependence on American banks in this situation as a tool of strength for American policy. 
Id. The institutions that carried out their lending operations through the Euromarkets to 
country and other borrowers apparently assumed that the American monetary authorities 
would act as lenders of last resort if there were a liquidity shortage in the Euromarkets. 
Id. at 12. There are three major reasons why the non-American banks would believe that 
the American monetary authorities would act as lenders of the last resort: 
Id. 
(1) Three-fourths of the outstanding international debt is denominated in U.S. dollars; 
(2) The primary provider of these funds for the credits were advanced by American 
banks. Ergo, the implication arises that if a foreign bank can not meet its obliga-
tion to American banks, then the Federal Reserve will step-in to meet the shortfall; 
and 
(3) The Federal Reserve is perceived to have adopted a policy of neglect during 
the expansion of international lending by the American banks. The prevailing Euro-
pean belief is that such neglect was an expression of tacit knowledge and approval 
of the situation. 
11. Brief for the United States as amicus <;Uriae at 2, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito 
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Costa Rica law was consistent with the policy of the United States, 
the panel did not have before it the views of the United States, 
and the panel's decision is based on an inaccurate understanding 
of the policy of the United States."12 The court's determination of 
the United States policy was based, in part, on the United States 
support of loan renegotiation by the legislative and executive bran-
ches of government.13 Under the circumstances of Allied, United 
States policy dictates that the courts should enforce a private com-
mercial loan contract on which the suit is brought in the United 
States.14 The court's determination, based on incorrect perceptions 
of United States policy, should not suggest "that Costa Rican debt 
to private creditors should be rendered unenforceable by virtue 
of actions of the Costa Rican Government to which the creditors 
did not agree."15 
United States policy with reference to private debt agreements 
seeks to encourage voluntary participation of private lenders in the 
restructuring process.16 The United States recognized that an 
"orderly resolution is crucial to the stability and future growth of 
the world and the U.S. economy ."17 A five-point strategy has been 
Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter cited as United States 
Brief]. 
12. Id. at 1. 
13. Id. The United States concluded that the court developed this incorrect interpreta-
tion of policy "upon certain actions of the executive and legislative branches" of the govern-
ment. Id. The certain actions cited were the President's certification to Congress under the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), a concurrent resolution of the House of Represen-
tatives, and a Paris Club Agreed Minute. The President's certification of the FAA dealt 
with the continued U.S. assistance despite the fact that Costa Rica was in default on loans 
extended by the U.S. under the Act; these were not commercial debts. As a multilateral 
agreement among creditor nations, the Paris · Club Agreed Minute was an understanding 
among those nations to recommend common terms for a bilateral restructuring of Costa 
Rica's debts extended by participating governments. The Minute does, though, recommend 
that Costa Rica seek to restructure private debts on comparable terms. Id. at 4. See also 
The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 12, 1984, at 36, col. 5. The IMF and Costa Rica are close 
to an agreement on a loan-adjustment program to aid repayments on its $1.4 billion debt 
to commercial banks. Id. The concurrent resolution of the House of Representatives was 
a general sympathetic statement in reference to Costa Rica's economic crisis. United States 
Brief at 4. 
14. United States Brief, supra note 11, at 3. 
15. Id. at 4. 
16. Id. The United States realized the possible repercussions of a debt collapse and 
the participation of private lenders in the restructuring of private debts is a key element 
of U.S. "policy designated to facilitate the orderly resolution of the difficult debt service 
problems faced by a considerable number of developing countries." Id. 
17. Id. 
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supported by the United States to deal with the debt service 
problem: 
(1) The implementation of economic adjustments by borrowing 
countries designed to stabilize their economies and restore sus-
tainable external positions; 
(2) An International Monetary Fund (IMF) adequately equipped to 
help borrowers design adjustment programs and provide balance 
of payments financing on a temporary basis while adjustment pro-
grams take effect; 
(3) Readiness of monetary authorities in creditor countries to pro-
vide short-term liquidity support, when essential to assist selected 
borrowers that are formulating adjustment programs with the 
IMF; 
(4) Encouragement to private markets to provide prudent levels 
of financing to borrowing countries in the process of implementing 
IMF-supported adjustment programs; and 
(5) Resumption of sustainable, non-inflationary economic expansion 
and maintenance of open markets, both in the industrial countries 
and in developing countries facing debt problems.18 
Though the debt problem has been "managed with reasonable 
success,"19 the United States showed concern that the progress 
might be halted by the court's decision. A pivotal element in the 
process has been the "willingness of commercial banks to reschedule 
debt and to provide credit to countries undertaking adjustment 
efforts."20 Lender confidence in the "enforceability of their loan 
agreements payable in New York is critical to their willingness to 
extend international credit."21 The uncertainty that has been in-
troduced into the process of "making and interpreting international 
financial agreements, leaving unclear ... the circumstances under 
which United States courts will give effect to a foreign government's 
actions limiting payments of obligations in the United States"22 may 
18. Id. at 4-5. 
19. Id. at 5. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 5-6. 
22. Id. at 6. The United States continued to enumerate what the court's decision sug-
gests a foreign sovereign borrower might have to demonstrate to a United States court 
to abrogate its obligations: 
6
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well discourage further commercial bank cooperation in providing 
new financing and taking adjustment measures.23 This would clearly 
jeopardize an orderly resolution of the debt situation.24 It has been 
Id. 
(i) a good faith desire to reschedule its debts, (ii) the temporary nature of the deferral 
or prohibition on payments, (iii) the concurrence of most of its creditors, (iv) a 
rescheduling of its public sector debt, (v) compliance with its own laws, (vi) that 
the law applicable to the debt is foreign law, (vii) the endorsement of its efforts 
by a resolution of one or both Houses of Congress, or (viii) a shortage of foreign 
exchange. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. See also The Wall Street Journal, supra note 13. For a practitioner's guide to 
defaults in the international forum, see Ryan, Defaults and Remedies under Internation Bank 
Loan Agreements with Foreign Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1 
U. OF ILL. L.R. 89 (1982). A loan agreement specifies that in the event of default, the syndicate 
has the right to end the lending relationship. This right includes declaring the outstanding 
loan due and payable. It is emphasized that this is a drastic step, one which a syndicate 
will rarely exercise unless it is deemed the last resort when all other possibilities have been 
exhausted. A syndicate will generally try to reschedule loans, obtain collateral, or obtain 
a guarantee as a method of dealing with a delinquent borrower. Id. at 90. While the remedies 
available to a banking syndicate are numerous, in reality, a banker will endeavor to cure 
a default by renegotiating the loan. Once a loan has been defaulted upon, there has to be 
a write-off against the bank's capital and reserves. This is not a popular occurrence due 
to the downward effect it has upon the bank's profitability. It is interesting to note that, 
traditionally, credit-worthiness of a customer is a primary consideration for the lending in-
stitution to base its loan decisions on. As competition increased, however, the once cautious 
bankers rationalized their past actions to justify the increasing dependence of their institu-
tions on the profits from their international loan portfolios. See generally The International 
Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, supra uote 4, at 11. Loan maturities had a minimal 
role in the structure of a country's requirements. Loans were "packaged" in terms of 
their magnitude and maturity either to meet market preferences or to fit the spread 
over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) that the borrower countries were inten-
ding to pay. Although the spreads represented a small proportion of the total cost of bor-
rowing, some bankers managed to transform this into an ad hoc credit-worthiness rating. 
Often, the loan maturities had to be shortened to fit the LIBOR spread expectations. Id. 
The situation evolved to where demand rather than supply dictated the ultimate size of 
the debt pool. Id. at 12. The mobilization of the short-term deposits and credit availability 
was accomplished through a system where lenders entered into a commitment to supply 
funds for a stated period without matching it with deposits of comparable maturities. This 
scheme allowed the banks to make periodic revisions in their interest rates at 3 or 6 month 
intervals. Because their interest rates are based on the cost of money to themselves plus 
an appropriate spread, the bank can borrow for each loan and thus refinance the amount 
that was originally loaned to the borrowers. Id. 
The notion that short-term loans were safer than long-term loans caused additional 
difficulty. Id. at 12. Lenders believed that a shorter maturity would allow them to recover 
their assets more rapidly than the other creditors. The market place was reluctant to re-
spond to the borrowers' demand for long-term credit, and with the ultimate power residing 
with the lenders, loan maturities became shorter to fit the lenders' preferences. Id. The 
ultimate result evidenced huge sums of borrowing becoming bunched to the point where 
a justified concern existed in reference to refinancing existing debt that was due for pay-
ment, as well as being able to secure new credit for further capital requirements. Id. at 
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suggested that a major bank default would radiate a financial shock 
that would echo throughout Wall Street, sending the price of gold 
skyrocketing and setting off political chaos in the defaulting 
12. These arrangements, in concert with the world economic situation, have led to a bank-
ing crisis. Apparently, the events that transpired were not envisioned by the numerous 
banking institutions that had become involved. 
While the reasons for the economic difficulties in Latin American countries vary, the 
general theme is one of overly ambitious economic growth. In Mexico, for example, the two 
major causes reside with the huge increases in public spending, post-1978, by the Portillo 
government, and the decision to keep the peso overvalued in an effort to slow down the 
inflationary effect of the public spending. Unfortunately, the end result was a massive trade 
deficit. To cope, short-term borrowing was employed to wrestle with the trade deficits and 
public spending. By February, 1982, the government was forced to devalue the peso in an 
effort to stimulate trade. Six months later, the U.S. provided Mexico with more than $6 
billion in loans while Mexico announced that they would negotiate a debt restructure with 
the IMF. The eventual nationalization of the banks and the imposition of exchange controls 
that banned the importation or exportation of currency managed to force private capital 
out of Mexico instead of locking it in. Domestic savings collapsed due to the negative real 
interest rates. 
It is important to compare the plight of Brazil with that of Mexico. Brazil's problems 
stem from the price of oil and its increase. Beyond that, many of the funds not compen-
sating for the trade deficit did go to various projects having economic justification. While 
Brazil is considered to be a more responsible borrower than Mexico, its debt has risen to 
the magnitude of $90 billion. It is doubtful that Brazil will ever pay back at 100 cents on 
the dollar, with interest, what it owes to foreign banks, exporters, and governments. There 
is also further concern of its domestic government debt that trebled in 1982. To add to this 
problem, productive investment is down while capital goods imports fell by 16% in 1981 
and an additional 10% in 1982. An increase in exports and a drop in world interest rates 
are necessary elements for Brazil's recovery. 
Argentina's military government that took power in 1976 brought a certain stability 
to an economic mess. The austerity exercised on the domestic sector helped transform a 
trade deficit into a large surplus with an accompanying drop in inflation from 6000/o to 500/o 
annually. The military government joined in the Latin American borrowing spree leading 
to an increase in government spending with the inevitable rise in inflation. The govern-
ment attempted to hold inflation by revaluing the peso to reduce import prices. The end 
result was an increased trade deficit. The government next tried to cut back at the domestic 
level forcing unemployment to 130/o from 30/o (the 1978 low) and, in turn, causing unrest 
among the trade unions and political parties. While the Falkland invasion of April, 1982, 
drew the people together, this unity was short-lived when the war was lost and the heavy 
costs of a military venture were paid. 
While the circumstances surrounding these three borrowing countries are varied, the 
bottom line is that the aggregate sum of their debt may very well exceed their ability to 
repay their creditors. See generally, Gall, Games- Bankers Play, FORBES, Dec. 5, 1983, at 172; 
The International Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, ECONOMIST, April 30, 1983, at 11. 
The funds currently being placed into the LDC's are not being utilized for long-term capital 
investment, but rather for the servicing of existing debt. Clearly, this arrangement is being 
undertaken to prevent a shock to the world's banking system. If Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, 
and Venezuela default on their outstanding loans, certain key American banks would col-
lapse. See swpra note 4, (consider the outstanding loans of key American banks to Latin 
American countries as a percentage of the bank's equity). The collapse of the American banks 
would be a solvency rather than a liquidity problem. Banks lend funds for longer periods 
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countries.25 Additionally, the hope for a world economic recovery 
would be quashed for the near future. 26 
III. THE NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE POSITION 
The New York Clearing House Association27 also filed a brief 
ami<:us curiae to urge the court for a rehearing. The Clearing House 
Association noted that unless Allied is set aside, such a decision 
may have the following effects on international banking: 
than they borrow. This is one method employed to make money; it is termed transforming 
maturities. It is clear that a bank could not repay all of its depositors at once, when its 
obligations are due, without getting help from its central bank or suffering large losses. 
An example would be a typical "rush" on a bank where depositors become nervous and at-
tempt to pull out their assets. This leads to a liquidity problem. 
The American banks face a solvency problem in Latin America. As a bank's bad debts 
(loans which will never be repaid) increase, a point is reached when the losses must be writ-
ten off against the bank's capital and reserves. Generally, capital and reserves amount to 
about 5% of a bank's total assets. It is clear that if a default occurs by a major Latin coun-
try, many major American banks will become insolvent. See The Crash of 198?, ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 16, 1982, at 23. 
25. Bottomless Debt, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1982, at 11. 
26. Id. While many theories of a possible international banking crisis have been 
advanced, this fear has substance due to various economic realities and interrelationships 
among countries. Five major factors will weigh considerably in the final dispensation of this 
problem: 
Id. 
(1) The falling price of oil makes oil exporting LDC's less able to service their ex-
ternal debt; 
(2) The falling price of oil translates into a less affluent Middle East. With such 
an event the oil exporting region will need its funds back that it deposited with 
the Western banks, who in turn advanced funds to the LDC's; 
(3) The banks have a large exposure in their portfolio to LDC's; 
(4) High interest rates make repayment difficult for LDC's. For Mexico and Brazil, 
each one percent decrease in interest rates saves them an estimated $750 million 
annually. Although interest rates have decreased, they remain high in real terms; 
(5) Politics: there is a general feeling that Latin America's debt problem will be 
difficult to shake off. This is a prevailing perception even though real advances 
have been made by the governments of major debtor countries. 
27. Brief for the New York Clearing House Association as amicus curiae, May 21, 1984, 
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). The Clearing House Association consists of twelve commercial banks in New York 
City. Of these banks, many are among the largest creditors of Central and South American 
debt. The members of the Association are: The Bank of New York, The Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A., Chemical Bank, Citibank, N.A., Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, Irving Trust Company, Bankers Trust Company, 
Marine Midland Bank, N.A., United States Trust Company of New York, National 
Westminster Bank U.S.A., and European American Bank & Trust Company. These banks 
have a vital interest in the outcome of Allied because many of the Clearing House Banks 
are leading participants as managers, agents, and lenders in syndicated commercial loans 
to foreign sovereigns, their industries, arid their private industries. See The International 
Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, supra note 4. 
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(1) Defaults may be encouraged; 
(2) Loss of bargaining power on the bank's side in the reschedul-
ing negotiations; 
(3) International banking may flee New York City for more 
favorable jurisdictions where judgments can be obtained as right 
in the event of a default; and 
(4) The possible move of lending to Europe would have a material 
adverse effect on the economy of New York and the United States, 
as well as diminish the importance of New York Law as the law 
of choice in international finance. 28 
The interest at stake for the Clearing House Association is evident 
as well as the possible repercussions to the American economy. 
IV. EXCLUSIVE OF LAW; A CONCERTED METHOD TO 
ESCAPE AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 
If loan defaults could be restricted to smaller debtors such as 
Costa Rica, the force of the law may very well benefit the lending 
institutions. Obviously, such a cooperative situation does not ex-
ist. The painful truth is that regardless of how American courts 
finally resolve the situation, the ramifications of a default by ma-
jor Latin American borrowers simply means a world economic crisis 
of proportions far beyond any past world depression. While a 
sovereign immunity defense may prove to exculpate a country from 
its debts, a default is not likely in the view of banking circles. This 
is because the deterrents against a country defaulting are too great. 
The consequences that befell Cuba in 1960 and Ghana briefly in 1962 
are a testament to world resolve. Yet, there is the fear that a 
maverick from the Third World may go where others have feared 
to tread.29 Fortunately, bridge financing by the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) has been instrumental in helping debtor 
countries, such as Mexico in 1982, pass through the rough spots.30 
28. Id. at 4. 
29. The Crash of 198?, supa note 5, at 25. See generally Re-Scheduling, ECONOMIST, Feb. 
18, 1984, at 81. 
30. In an effort to stem country liquidity cries, the BIS in Basel, Switzerland, began 
to lend to countries outside of Western Europe. The BIS is the central bank for Western 
European central banks. During the bail-out of Mexico in 1982, the BIS arranged a $1.85 
billion short-term line of credit of which 50% came from America's Federal Reserve Bank. 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1984], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/7
1984] Recent Developments 153 
The magnitude of the problem is reflected in the situation that 
Brazil precipitated in December, 1982. Brazil "unilaterally" declared 
its inability to service its debt. The banks had no choice but to con-
cede to Brazil's requests, otherwise an economic crisis would have 
ensued. The Brazilian actions gave a shocking and new perspective 
to the whole problem of outstanding world indebtedness. Bank loans 
became frozen assets.31 The lesson derived from this scenario is that 
when lenders are involved with a borrower to the point where their 
own solvency is at issue, it is the borrower that dictates and the 
lender that follows. 32 
It is inevitable that western governments will have to become 
involved in solving Latin America's financial troubles. It does not 
appear that the LDC's have the experience to solve the problem 
on their own. The lending institutions will eventually have to face 
up to a massive write-off against their assets and reserves. The 
short-term solution has been to follow the IMF's lead in buying time 
and anticipating a surge in world trade that will raise commodity 
prices. The increased export earnings may then be applied to easily 
service their debts. However, such short-term remedies do not of-
fer a solution to the problem. 
A. SOLUTIONS TO THE DEBT CRISIS 
Proposals have been offered in the banking community and 
official circles to develop a facility of funds to aid national govern-
ments that cannot meet their obligations.33 The fundamental prob-
lem with increased reliance on temporary stabilization by IMF or 
World Bank loans is that the temporary nature of the aid is not 
a solution to the ailment. IMF loans require strict domestic austerity 
that reduces external dependency.34 This would lead to a greater 
The Mexican loan was offered in installments conditioned on continual progress in IMF talks. 
This is the bridge financing that is necessary to keep countries solvent until long-term 
financing through the IMF can become effective. This action by the BIS signaled strong 
involvement by an official body to avert a banking collapse. The BIS is a "semi-political" 
organization that will have to develop a dialogue with major lending institutions if progress 
in this arena is to confinue. See generally The Crash of 198?, supra note 5, at 23. 
31. The International Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, supra note 4, at 13. 
32. Id. 
33. J. DEAN & I. GIDDY, AVERTING INTERNATIONAL BANKING CRISES 37 (1981). This to a 
certain extent has been undertaken by the World Bank and the IMF. The reduction of one 
source of global risk leads to a certain confidence that can help stem a bank failure. Id. 
34. Id. at 37. Without the strict IMF standards, Dean and Giddy argue that adverse 
effects may result. If credit was extended to governments at below market rates, there 
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dependence by the entire banking system on the IMF whose 
guarantee invoked more frequently would lead to the ultimate pro-
viders of funds; the taxpayers of the industrial countries.35 
Additionally, an international deposit insurance corporation 
(!DIC) has been suggested as a multinational, non-profit insurer 
backed by major governments.36 Such an entity would likely raise 
confidence in international banking, but it also presents potential 
problems. A great deal of regulatory authority would have to be 
vested in the IDIC.37 Among the powers invested in an !DIC, would 
be examinatory powers and the power to constrain the domestic 
and international activities of commercial banks.38 "Such a transfer 
[of power] carries connotations both of a substantial loss of domestic 
regulatory autonomy, and of a supranational regulatory monolith."39 
The flaw with such an international organization is that its authority 
far exceeds its limited resources and power .'0 Therefore, without 
the creation of a world central bank,'1 an !DIC is of little value. 
The argument has been advanced that even though competi-
tion is desirable in international banking, the "new market environ-
ment" demands a new regulatory structure.'2 The search for a 
uniform system applicable to financial institutions might be found 
in a "supranational lender-of-last resort facility ... supported by 
at minimum the Group of Ten central banks."'3 The expectation is 
that such a well-supported facility would serve to enhance con-
is a built-in incentive to borrow more than one otherwise would and to invest in projects 
with lower yields and/or higher risk than those normally accepted. Secondly, because IMF 
loans are, in effect, guarantees against country risk, banks would not need to analyze coun-
try risk and would, therefore, lend more capital than they otherwise normally would to higher 
risk countries or unproductive projects. Id. For an account of the political and social effects 
of "austerity," see N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984, at D2, col. 1. 





40. Id. at 40. 
41. The reason that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is effective is 
due to the underlying knowledge that it is an instrumentality of the U.S. Government and 
is secured by the money-creating Jjower vested in the Federal Reserve Bank. Id. 
42. Id. at 41. 
43. Id. at 41 (quoting EDWARDS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATIONS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: AFTER THE CRASH 19 (1980)); The Group of Ten is composed of prosperous coun-
tries who fix and regulate their policies in international monetary activities. It is composed 
of Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, 
and West Germany. Switzerland is an unofficial member. 
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fidence in international banking." "One must conclude that until 
the world is ready for a global central bank with centralized 
monetary policy and economic power any proposal for a supra-
national lender of ~ast resort cannot be taken seriously."'5 
These solutions attempt to approach a method of returning con-
fidence for both domestic and international banks. Unfortunately, 
the financing needs of the LDC's may not be met in the 1980's, thus 
creating a deflationary bias to the world economy .'6 But, with the 
current exposure of lending institutions the ability to raise addi-
tional capital will be impaired.'7 The involvement of additional bank-
ing institutions, the by-passing of banks and financial intermediaries 
altogether, and the shift or financing to official agencies has been 
advocated.'8 Of these three solutions to the immediate problem, the 
shifting of financing away from the private sector to the IMF, the 
World Bank, and governments has considerable support. The threat 
of stagnation raises serious social and political consequences in many 
of the LDC's. In an effort to bind together the debt problem, the 
IMF may have to play a pivotal role.'9 Such a role, however, can-
not be played out if the IMF is cut off from adequate financial 
resources and the necessary political support.50 
44. Id. It is likely that such a facility would fall prey to the same problems as an IDIC 
discussed earlier. The problem of giving the supranational body authority is that it would 
undermine central banks' monetary control. But, without such power, the banking public 
would be unable to rely on this body and would° be forced to look to the individual central 
banks. The question of where the supranational bank would get its money is relevant as 
well as the question of whether or not the supranational lender of last resort would sup-
port banks from non-participating countries. The peril of creating such a body is that it 
could easily become nothing but a bureaucratic coordinating age~cy. Id. 
45. Id. at 41-42. 
46. Llewellyn, Avoiding an International Banking Crisis, NAT'L. WESTMINSTER BANK 
Q. REV. 28, 29 (Aug. 1982). There is a "potential capital constraint" in countries whose banks 
have gone through an increase in their external capital assets forcing capital ratios to 
deteriorate considerably. See also United States Brief, supra note 11, at 1. 
47. Id. at 35. 
48. Id. at 36. While the American banks have the greatest exposure to LDC's, there 
are many banks that are unable to increase their stake in the LDC's. As the American banks 
declined from over a 50% exposure in 1975 to less than 40% in 1980, the Japanese and 
European banks increased their exposures. Since 1979, OPEC institutions have also become 
a factor. Yet, one would be hard pressed to believe that the exposure levels of the American 
banks will ever be reached by the European and the Japanese institutions. Id. 
49. Solomon, Congress Should Act Quickly on IMF Funding, AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 
26, 1983, at 4, col. 1. 
50. Id. Solomon argues that without the IMF at the helm, the consequences are grave. 
For example, debtor countries would be forced to include more protectionist measures and 
credit controls that would lead to price distortions and damage to the private sector. For 
a discussion on world economy and the effect of protectionist measures, see Tumlir, The World 
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The IMF's rescue schemes have managed to buy time for the 
banking community to plan their next move. The need for a long-
term solution is paramount to avoid the specter of insolvency of 
both banks and countries. 51 The ultimate impact of an IMF plan could 
lead to the taxpayers of the industrialized countries, in effect, bailing 
out the banks when the debtor countries fail to pay their obliga-
tions. This would likely cause a political storm that politicians would 
prefer to avoid. Governments fear both a run on banks and the 
political odium of a taxpayer's bail-out.52 There are other proposed 
solutions that may be more workable. 
The conversion of debtor countries' short-term debt into long-
term debt utilizing bonds that carry a lower and fixed rate of 
interest53 might be a better solution than involving the IMF. An 
approach that is classic in the corporate arena is to convert debt 
into equity.54 Both of these arrangements may be workable and 
speculation exists as to the possibility of a market developing to 
absorb either the newly issued debt or equity. If the creditors were 
willing to sell their investments at an appropriate discount, it is 
likely that the open-market would invest in the debtor countries' 
obligations. 
The aforementioned solutions recognize that there is too much 
existing debt bunched in short-term maturities with high floating 
interest rates. Unfortunately, they do not address the necessity of 
Economy Today: Crisis or a New Beginning?, NAT'L WESTMINSTER BANK Q. REV., Aug. 1983, 
at 26. 
51. It has long been advanced that after the consent of lenders, the IMF should pro-
pose long-term rescheduling of the debt. This should take into consideration not only the 
immediate cash requirements of a country, but also a projection of earnings and expenditures 
over a long period of time, for example thirteen years. At that point, the IMF could step 
in and guarantee the last two years of payments (years 12 and 13). This would show that 
the IMF is behind the country. Such a rescheduling would give a debtor a realistic time 
for the world economy to accelerate and for the debtor's economy to develop a surplus to 
service its debts. If a borrower fell behind on the IMF program, the guarantees would be 
revoked; this would act as a safeguard against debtors offloading on the IMF guarantee. 
The International Debt Threat: A Way to Avoid a Crash, supra note 4, at 11. 
52. ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 1983, at 85. 
53. Id. This has been advanced by F. Rohatyn and P. Kenen. The fact that there is 
too much debt bunched in short-term maturities with high floating interest rates has caus-
ed a major impass. The debt could be bought at a 10% discount of book value in exchange 
for the bonds. If debtors amortized the full face of the debt, then the 10% discount would 
finance the official conversion. The beauty of such an approach is that the taxpayer is not 
involved and the banks would carry the loss of a definite amount. Id. 
54. Id. This has been advanced by N. Bailey. Creditors continue to receive interest 
rate payments, but replace their amortization with a contract that would entitle them to 
some fixed percentage of a debtor's export earnings during the life of the loan. Id. 
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an official body that is able to install investor confidence in the bond 
or equity issues. A variation on the Chrysler Corporation Loan 
Guarantee Act of 197955 provides a workable solution to the debt 
crisis faced by the major banking institutions as well as the world.56 
While the Chrysler Corporation financial problem was not of the 
scale of the current debt crisis among the Latin and South American 
countries, the parallels between the two situations are evident.57 
The countries of the industrialized world, acting through a "deb-
tor country loan board," would guarantee the secured notes of the 
individual debtor country. Therefore, Brazil, Argentina, and Costa 
Rica, for example, would issue individual country notes. These notes 
could be rated according to a country risk rating, priced accordingly, 
and then matched with those who have an economic interest in the 
debtor country. The sources for this plan would include concessions 
or a certain percentage of loan write-offs by the banking syndicates, 
as well as the issuance of common stock made available to the deb-
tor government's employees and trade creditors. 
The secured notes would be distributed through commercial 
and investment banking operations to investors such as govern-
ments, institutions, pension funds, and individuals. This financing 
scheme would be a bridge during a difficult period. As in the 
55. H.R. REP. No. 96-690, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 2787. 
56. A description of the notes is contained in the offering circular dated February 
27, 1981. The head underwriters in the deal were Salomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch White 
Weld Capital Markets Group, The First Boston Corporation, E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc., 
and Warburg Paribus Becker. The offering circular is entitled $400,000,000, 14.9% Secured 
Notes due October 15, 1990, fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United 
States of America, acting through the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board, issued 
by the Chrysler Corporation. A copy of the offering circular is available through the Syracuse 
University College of Law Library. 
57. The Chrysler Corporation is the third largest car and truck manufacturer in the 
United States and the nation's tenth largest corporation. Subsequent to exhaustive hear-
ings, the United States Government recognized the need for Federal financial assistance 
in the form of loan guarantees. The need for assistance was predicated on the belief that 
a default by Chrysler would have "substantial consequences for the nation's economy, the 
Federal budget, the balance of payments and, above all, several hundred thousand individual 
human beings." See H.R. REP. No. 96-690, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2789. The government assisted to the extent of up to $1.5 billion in Federal 
loan guarantees that would be matched equally by others who had an economic stake in 
Chrysler, as required by legislation. The sources of the $1.5 billion "matching" funds were 
parties with an existing financial stake in Chrysler's health who gave financing commitments 
or concessions, capital obtained through merger or sale of securities, proceeds from asset 
dispositions, and the issuance of $100 million of common stock made available to Chrysler's 
employees and employee representative groups. See H.R. REP. No. 96-690, at 2789. 
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Chrysler case, this would not be a permanent crutch.58 The im-
plementation of such a financial plan would aid in the success of 
the debtor countries' economic future as well as provide an invest-
ment vehicle for appropriate investors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The critical truth is that the international debt crisis is greater 
than the law that seeks to enforce such legal obligations. This in-
volves not the misjudgments of a few financial institutions, but the 
entire banking system. The over-commitment by this interlocking 
system may prove disastrous unless a plan is conceived that can 
solve the problem rather than act as a stop-gap for the short-term. 
The continued financial stability of the entire banking system is 
necessary for growth in the world economy. 
The reaction of official bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the BIS are only short-term solutions.59 The assumption that 
the LDC's present a mere liquidity problem and not a harbinger 
of insolvency is false. It is apparent that the lending institutions 
and the countries involved in the international debt crisis were 
overly ambitious in their desire for economic expansion and 
prosperity. While there have been no major defaults, it is obvious 
that the lending institutions have stretched to unusual lengths to 
prevent their borrowers from defaulting. 
The ultimate solution must embody two key premises: banks 
must write off a certain portion of the outstanding obligations as 
bad debt, and the open market will have to absorb a new discounted 
debt or equity conversion of the outstanding obligations. Proceeding 
along such a line will spare the taxpayers of the industrialized 
nations the cost of this financial debacle. While the magnitude of 
58. It is interesting to note that if Chrysler had become bankrupt, the bankruptcies 
of supplier companies and Chrysler dealers would have ensued. See H.R. REP. No. 96-690, 
at 2789. While the Chrysler situation is on a smaller scale than the world debt crisis, it 
does illustrate the vast interconnections between an institution, be it a corporation or a 
sovereign government, and the lives it has an effect upon in an adverse turn of economic 
events. 
59. At the 1984 Joint Annual IMF-World Bank meeting in Washington, D.C., the Third 
World debtor countries were advised to "streamline" their economies and to take steps to 
attract foreign investment in pursuit of solving their financial difficulties. This official pro-
nouncement may lead to an open market solution to the debt crisis. U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Donald Regan echoed this sentiment when he stated that the U.S. will resume its earlier 
push to have the World Bank strongly encourage private enterprise and investment capital 
to serve as a "catalyst" rather than as a channel for developing loans. Wall Street Journal, 
Sept. 25, 1984, at 33, col. 2. 
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the debt is huge, after a portion is written off by the banks, a signifi-
cant amount could be absorbed by private institutions and govern-
ments that find that the risk and reward associated with the in-
vestment is within their parameters of acceptability. Without such 
an alternative, the deadweight of the LDC's nonperforming debt 
will cause a collapse of the world economy beyond any depression 
that the world economy has yet sustained. 
Therefore, on rehearing the Allied court has a great respon-
sibility to shape the law that will be a guide for the banking in-
dustry in its resolution of the international debt crisis. 
Frank Charles Forelle 
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